Killing for Possession and Killing for Survival: Gender and the Criminal Law of Provocation and Self-Defense by Rosiejka, Danielle
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2012
Killing for Possession and Killing for Survival:
Gender and the Criminal Law of Provocation and
Self-Defense
Danielle Rosiejka
Seton Hall Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Rosiejka, Danielle, "Killing for Possession and Killing for Survival: Gender and the Criminal Law of Provocation and Self-Defense"
(2012). Law School Student Scholarship. 54.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/54
Killing for Possession and Killing for Survival: 
Gender and the Criminal Law of Provocation and 
Self-Defense 
 
Danielle Rosiejka 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................1 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROVOCATION ..................................................2 
A. The English Common Law .................................................................................................2 
B. The American Common Law .............................................................................................3 
C. The Modern Trend ..............................................................................................................3 
D. Extreme Emotional Disturbance and the Model Penal Code .............................................4 
III. GENDER BIAS IN PROVOCATION...................................................................................6 
A. Characteristics of Intimate Partner Killings .......................................................................6 
B. The Gendered Reality of Reasonableness ..........................................................................7 
C. An untenable Expansion of Provocation ..........................................................................10 
D. Sending a Message ...........................................................................................................12 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN’S SYNDROME
........................................................................................................................................................13 
V. SELF-DEFENSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ..............................................................15 
A. The Case of Judy Norman ................................................................................................16 
B. The Problem with Imminence ..........................................................................................18 
C. Battered Woman as Reasonable Self-Defenders ..............................................................21 
i. Preconceived notions of battered woman ..............................................................23 
ii. Gender and Emotion ..............................................................................................26 
D. The Catch 22 in Battered Woman’s Syndrome ................................................................28 
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................31 
 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The doctrines of provocation and self-defense tend to excuse typically masculine 
outbursts of violence.  The histories of both doctrines have been grounded in masculine 
conceptions of violence and reasonableness.  These male dominated assumptions have excluded 
an effective framework for understanding women’s experiences and have consequently led to a 
failure of the criminal justice system to adequately protect women who are the victims of 
domestic violence.   
In Part II, I will discuss the history and origins of the doctrine of provocation.  This 
section breaks down the legal elements of voluntary manslaughter, comparing the common law 
approach and the modern approach to the language of the Model Penal Code.  Part III analyzes 
why the doctrine of provocation primarily benefits male defendants who kill their intimate 
partners and how the doctrine condones violence against women.  Part IV summarizes the law of 
self-defense and briefly explains Battered Woman’s Syndrome and its applicability to claims of 
provocation and self-defense.  This information will serve as a backdrop for Part V, in which I 
focus on how the gender biases, present in the law of self-defense, do not adequately protect 
women who have been victims of domestic violence. 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROVOCATION 
In criminal law, provocation is a possible partial defense in which the defendant alleges a 
sudden or temporary loss of control as a response to another’s provocative conduct.1   If 
successful, the defense will mitigate an intentional murder charge to a voluntary manslaughter 
charge.
2
  Although voluntary manslaughter involves a criminal killing, it carries a lesser sentence 
                                                        
1
 JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 
381 (2008).  
2
 Id.  
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then homicides classified as murder.
3
  To fully understand how the doctrine of voluntary 
manslaughter affects women, an analysis of the common law origin of the provocation doctrine 
and its evolution is necessary.   
A. The English Common Law 
The doctrine of manslaughter originated in sixteenth century England as a legal remedy 
to protect men who attempted to defend their honor through physical attack or mutual violence 
from the death penalty.
4
  Over time this approach came to require a finding of three elements: (1) 
the defendant was provoked; (2) the defendant remained provoked during the commission of the 
crime, and (3) the provocation was deemed sufficient to enrage a reasonable man.
5
  
The English common law approach, often referred to as murder in the “heat of passion” 
eventually expanded to include homicides committed in response to a wife’s adultery.6  This 
inclusion of wife’s adultery as adequate provocation reflects the historical treatment of wives as 
the property of their husbands.
7
  Under the doctrine of coverture, a woman’s rights were 
subsumed by those of her husband.
8
  As articulated by historian Lawrence Stone, “Women have 
for millennia been regarded as the sexual property of men and that their value of this property is 
diminished if it has been or is being used by anyone other than the legal owner.”9  It is important 
                                                        
3
  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 573 (1972).   
4
  See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.  
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 426 (1982).   
5
 Id. at 427.   
6
 Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectively, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1061-162 
2005) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003)).  
7
 Id.  
8
 Id.  
9
 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 138 
(1979).  
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to note that even as the doctrine of provocation evolved it was only available to men.
10
  It took 
275 years for an English court to finally acknowledge that women who kill their adulterous 
husbands could also employ the provocation defense.
11
   
B. The American Common Law  
 Early American common law adopted the English model of provocation.  The only 
noteworthy deviation is that the American common law streamlined what was considered 
“adequate provocation” by adopting a categorical approach to provocation.12  Under this 
approach, adequate provocation was limited to four main categories: physical assault, unlawful 
arrest, mutual combat, and witnessing the actual adultery of one’s spouse.13  In limiting 
mitigation to the four aforementioned categories, the common law established a clear standard of 
when a defendant’s violence could be considered reasonable and thus justified or excused.14   
C. The Modern Trend  
The modern approach expanded the definition of adequate provocation by abandoning 
the legal categories of provocation and replacing it with a reasonable person test.
15
  The 
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions is evaluated under a two-prong test that incorporates an 
objective and subjective inquiry.  The first prong requires a finding of adequate provocation.
16
 
                                                        
10
 See Caroline A. Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in Australia, 
Canada, and the United States, 14.1 J. OF GEN., SOC. POL’Y. & L. 31 (2006).  
11
 Antonia Elise Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of 
Reasonableness in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 249 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Inherent Unreasonableness].  
12
 Donna Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.  CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 80 (1992).  
13
 Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the 
Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 670 (2001) (quoting Coker, supra note 10, at 78) 
[hereinafter Miller, (Wo)manslaughter].  
14
 Id.  
15
 KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 1, at 350-52.  
16
 Id.  
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Adequate provocation is recognized as long as a reasonable person would have been provoked.
17
  
Furthermore, it must be established that the defendant was in fact provoked.
18
  The second prong 
requires a finding of an insufficient time to cool down.
19
  In other words, a defendant must show 
that there was no interval between the provocation and the killing that would allow the person to 
process the provocation and regain control.  This constraint is justified by the notion that after a 
period of time, a reasonable provoked person would have cooled off between the provocation 
and the homicide.
20
  As noted previously, the time must be objectively insufficient (a reasonable 
person would not have cooled), and subjectively insufficient (the defendant did not in fact cool 
off).  In addition, the modern approach made clear that adequate provocation included not only 
reactions out of rage or anger but also any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic 
emotion.
21
  Moreover, adequate provocation could also be found where there was a period of 
prolonged taunting and provocation.
22
  
D. Extreme Emotional Disturbance and the Model Penal Code 
The American Law Institute (“ALI”), the creator of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), 
criticized the common law’s formulation of voluntary manslaughter as being underdeveloped, 
claiming that the defense existed in only the “barest skeletal delineation.”23  The MPC version of 
provocation is referred to as extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) and is contained in section 
210.3(b) of the Code.  The Code prescribes that:  
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . (b) a homicide 
which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of 
                                                        
17
 Id.  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id.  
20
 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, at 663. 
21
 People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 781 (1976).  
22
 See State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (1915).  
23
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 2 (2004). 
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extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse.  The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation 
under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
24
 
The MPC’s formulation of EED “was designed to sweep away ‘the rigid rules that have 
developed with respect to the sufficiency of a particular types of provocation, such as the rule 
that words alone can never be enough.
25
 
The MPC approach is more subjective than the common law or modern trend approaches.  
Throughout this paper I will generally refer to MPC’s approach as a test of subjective 
reasonableness.  However, it is important to note that the MPC’s formulation contains both 
objective and subjective components.  The objective component comes into play when 
evaluating the defendant’s reaction to the extreme emotional disturbance and the nature of the 
extreme emotional disturbance.  The EED must be caused by a “reasonable explanation or 
excuse,”26 and the defendant’s provoked response must be objectively reasonable.   Theoretically 
the inclusion of this objective inquiry was to prevent abuse of the doctrine by creating a limit to 
the application of the defense.
27
  
The subjective element comes into effect when the defendant’s extreme emotional 
disturbance is evaluated “from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be.”28   To be clear, the subjective inquiry is taken into 
consideration only in determining the defendant’s perceptions of the circumstances, not in 
                                                        
24
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210. 3(1)(b) (2004).   
25
 People v. Cassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (1980).  
26
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)(2004). 
27
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)(2004)cmt.5(a).  
28
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)(2004).  
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assessing the reasonableness of the resulting response.
29
  However, it remains unclear what 
factors a jury should consider in attempting to analyze the reasonableness of a defendant’s 
actions “from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as 
the defendant believed them to be.”  In general it has been accepted that only physical attributes 
of the defendant, such as age, race, handicaps, and mental capacity, should be considered, not 
idiosyncratic moral values.
30
  Nonetheless, the ALI has not articulated a bright line test for 
determining which elements of an actor’s situation are relevant.  
III. GENDER BIAS IN PROVOCATION  
A. Characteristics of Intimate Partner Killings 
Although both women and men kill, homicide is an act primarily committed by men.
31
  In 
general, when men kill, they are “more likely to kill acquaintances or strangers,” while women 
commonly kill an intimate partner, such as a boyfriend or husband. 
32
 Although women are less 
likely to be the victims of homicide in general, women are much more likely to be the victims 
then men when it comes to intimate partner homicide.
33
  In 2007, the number of females 
murdered by intimates was 1,640 while the number of males murdered by partners was 700.
34
  
Females made up 70% of the victims killed by an intimate partner in 2007, a figure that has 
                                                        
29
 Kevin John Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the 
Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 1, 68-69 (1998).  
30
 MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3(1)(b)(2004) cmt.5 (a)  
31
 Wendy Keller, Disparate Treatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 255, 261 (1996). 
32
 Geris Serran & Philip Firestone, Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male 
Proprietariness and the Self-Defense Theories, 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 1, 1-15 
(2004).  
33
 Keller, supra note 31, at 261.  
34
 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2008), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=5.  
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changed little since 1993.
35
  Evidence from police files, psychiatric reports, case law, and 
interviews clearly demonstrate that the motives behind intimate partner homicide are sex 
segregated.
36
  Male motives behind intimate homicide predominately revolve around 
possessiveness.
37
  Common possessive motives include “the husband accusing the wife of sexual 
infidelity, by her decision to end the relationship, and/or by his desire to control her . . . .”38 In 
contrast, when women commit domestic homicide, they tend to do so out of fear and as a result 
of continued abuse.
39
  Research further suggests that male victims of female-initiated intimate 
homicides “often initiate the homicidal act with threats of or actual physical violence.”40  In other 
words, women kill their abusers, while men kill their partners out of jealously, desertion, or 
actual or perceived infidelity.  
B. The Gendered Reality of Reasonableness  
Regardless of whether the objective modern approach or the MPC’s subjective approach 
is applied, the concept of reasonableness is central to the law of provocation.  On their face, the 
modern and MPC approaches to provocation seem gender neutral.  Under the modern approach, 
the key question is whether the provocative incident was sufficient to cause a reasonable man to 
lose their sense of self-control.
41
  Although the modern approach has moved towards an arguably 
more gender neural standard, with the replacement of the “reasonable man” standard with the 
“reasonable person” standard, masculine notions of reality characterize the reasonableness 
requirement of adequate provocation.   This gendered characterization of reasonableness has 
                                                        
35
 Id.  
36
 Serran & Firestone, supra note 32, at 12. 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id.  
39
 Keller, supra note 31, at 261.  
40
 Serran & Firestone, supra note 32, at 13. 
41
 Miller, Inherent Unreasonableness, supra note 11, at 260. 
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granted protection to angry, jealous men who kill their partners in the heat of passion, but not 
women who kill their partners for the same reason.  
As previously noted, the English courts adopted the “reasonable man” standard in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.
42
  During this time period, married women were considered the 
property of their husbands.
43
  In addition, the reasonable requirement was commonly thought to 
be inapplicable to women due to their irrational nature.
44
 The “reasonable man” standard reveals 
centuries of discrimination towards women.   
Women are not accommodated in the traditional male concept of reasonable provocation.  
As one scholar observes, “Instead of developing a new standard free from a history of sex 
discrimination and free of gendered language, the legal community continues to hold females to 
a standard of reasonableness clearly rooted in the male experience.”   Female defendants are 
disadvantaged when the reasonableness standard is objectively applied under the modern 
approach because what we consider reasonable is influenced by prevailing gender stereotypes 
and deeply ingrained societal norms.  These beliefs make it seem acceptable for a man to kill his 
partner, but irrational for women to do the same. 
A man who kills his wife after finding her with another man is the paradigm example of 
provocation.  Although, his conduct is considered morally wrong and reprehensible, his conduct 
is not viewed as shocking, but rather expected, or at least easily foreseeable.
45
  Conversely, a 
woman who kills her husband or partner after learning of his infidelity are viewed as irrational 
                                                        
42
 Burke, supra note 6, at 1062.  
43
 Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and 
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1691 (1986).  
44
 Id.  
45
 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R. – C.L. REV. 623, 628-29 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights].  
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and particularly deviant.
46
  In commenting on how the law responds to female killers, Professor 
Schneider notes, “The law has traditionally viewed husband-killing as a crime that strikes at the 
root of all civil government, threatening a basic conception of traditional society.”47  Reflecting 
on the different perceptions of female and male intimate-partner killers, William Blackstone 
explains:  
[I]f the baron kills his feme it is the same as if had killed a 
stranger, or any other person; but if the feme kills her baron, it is 
regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime, as she not 
only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal 
affection, but throws off all subjection to the authority of her 
husband.  And therefore the law denominates her crime a species 
of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had 
killed the king.
48
  
 
This societal belief that it is almost inherently unreasonable for a woman to kill her 
partner makes it more difficult for women to avail themselves of the provocation doctrine.  As 
Professor Schneider notes, “It is simply impossible for many, lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and 
the public at large to imagine that women are acting reasonably when they kill their intimate 
partners.”49  Considering the different reasons which men and women kill their intimate partners, 
as previously discussed, it is particularly troubling that women who have killed their batterers 
have received harsher sentences than men who kill their partners due to perceived or actual 
infidelity.
50
   
                                                        
46
 Id.  
47
 Id. at 629.  
48
 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 418 n. 103 (1987).  
49
 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal 
Perspectives on Battered Woman who Kill: Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 504 
(1996) [hereinafter Schneider, Self-Defense].  
50
 Margaret A. Cain, Comment, The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act: 
Its Legacy and Future, 34 TULSA L.J. 36, 380 (1999) (discussing that when a man kills his 
partner, the average prison sentence is two to six years, while a woman who kills her batterer 
receives an average prison sentence of twelve to sixteen years).  
10 
 
C. An Untenable Expansion of Provocation  
The MPC’s extreme emotional disturbance has greatly expanded the doctrine of 
provocation in two main ways, which has been particularly disastrous for women.  The first 
problem lies in the MPC’s shift to an almost purely subjective test.  The MPC asks whether the 
defendant killed “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse,”51 but this disturbance is to be assessed “from the viewpoint of 
a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”52  The only 
limitation, which is suggested in the Code’s Commentary, is that “idiosyncratic moral values are 
not part of the actor’s situation.”53   Because the MPC’s subjective approach focuses on the 
intensity of emotion experienced by the accused, virtually any reaction to any stimulus may be 
considered in an EED jurisdiction.  
This subjective focus has allowed for an almost unlimited array of situations that may be 
considered adequate provocation.  This has led to an instruction on EED in extreme cases, such 
as where a man killed his girlfriend’s lover for taunting him about the girlfriend’s likely 
infidelity;
54
 where a man, distraught over losing his passport, beat to death a prostitute because 
she would not sleep with him for free;
55
 where a man fatally shot a former partner for dancing 
                                                        
51
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b)(2004).  
52
 Id.  
53
 Reporter’s Comments, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to § 210.3, at 62-63 
(1980). 
54
 People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 316, 319-22 (2000) (holding that the defendant was entitled to a 
an instruction on EED for killing his girlfriend’s lover, who taunted him about his girlfriend’s 
past and likely future infidelity).  
55
 State v. Kaddah, 732 A. 2d. 902, 910-12 (Conn. 1999) (commenting that an EED instruction 
was properly given in this case).  
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with another man.
56
  These decisions show an impermissible acceptance of typically masculine 
reactions such as rage and jealously.  
Second, the MPC in effect eliminates the no cooling-off period limitation of the modern 
and common law approach. As explained in People v. Patterson, requiring an absence of cooling 
time does not comport with the MPC’s EED formulation because “[a]n action influenced by an 
extreme emotional disturbance is not one that is necessarily so spontaneously undertaken.  
Rather, it may be that a significant mental trauma affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial 
period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the 
fore.”57  By eliminating the cooling-off period, the MPC opens the door for claims where a 
provoking incident leads to a homicide days, weeks, or even months later.   In fact, under the 
MPC there does not even have to be a particular triggering event.  Instead, “[a] killer who 
brooded over his homicidal feelings, without even having a fully comprehensible desire for 
revenge, remains eligible for manslaughter mitigation.”58  
 The elimination of the cooling of period limitation and triggering incident allows 
defendants to come up with any post hoc justification to rationalize their killings.  Although it is 
ultimately up to the jury to decide whether they believe the defendant’s extreme emotional 
disturbance, the subjective focus of this defense generally requires expert testimony on the 
defendant’s mental state.  Expert testimony can be problematic because it can give “scientific” 
legitimacy to even the most unexplainable crimes.  As Professor Carolyn Ramsey explains, 
“Unmoored from common law constraints, the EED defense allows a sympathetic psychological 
                                                        
56
 CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTROOM 36-38 (2003).   
57
 People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 303 (1976).  
58
 Carolyn v. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law 
Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (2010).  
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expert to reinterpret the defendant’s history of increasingly brutal dominance over the victim as a 
logical progression from emotional trauma to uncontrollable violence.”59    
Lastly, the expansive scope of EED has allowed mitigation for male defendants who kill 
their partner simply for leaving the relationship.  This is an unprincipled and unacceptable 
expansion from the common law’s requirement of witnessing adultery. 
D. Sending a Message  
Leaving a relationship, learning of the infidelity of a spouse,
60
 or killing in response to a 
general “loss of control”61 should not be considered adequate provocation.  Court decisions that 
mitigate murder committed under these conditions condone the behavior of angry and violent 
men who exploit stereotypical explanations to legitimize their homicides against “their” women.   
Provocation is an excuse-based defense.
62
   It recognizes the conduct committed as 
legally wrong, however, it excuses the conduct due to the nature of the provoking incident.
63
 The 
theory being that if the provoking incident was of such a degree, that any reasonable person 
would have lost control, the actor is less morally blameworthy because he could not help but to 
react in that way.
64
  A finding that it is “reasonable” for a man to kill his girlfriend because she 
was unfaithful or because she simply did not want to continue the relationship, wrongly casts 
blame on the victim, where she has done nothing legally wrong.  In recognizing provocation in 
these situations, the law condones domestic violence against women and reinforces the 
stereotype that men are jealous, angry actors who are incapable of controlling their reactions.  
                                                        
59
 Id. at 18.  
60
 Learning of infidelity should not be interpreted to include actually witnessing adultery.  
61
 A specific triggering that causes one to lose control is not considered a general loss of control.  
62
 Heller, supra note 29, at 10 -12.  
63
 Id.  
64
 Id. 
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN’S 
SYNDROME 
At common law, an actor was justified in using force upon another to prevent injury to 
himself if he honestly and reasonably believed such force was necessary to protect himself from 
imminent unlawful harm.
65
  The principle behind self-defense is that a person who is unlawfully 
attacked by another and who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his defense should be 
able to take reasonable steps to defend himself.
66
  
Today, self-defense is generally divided into two forms: (1) perfect self-defense, and (2) 
imperfect self-defense.  They key factor in determining if is “perfect” or “imperfect” self-defense 
is the reasonableness of the actor’s decision to use force.  Perfect self-defense occurs when the 
actor’s belief in the necessity of using force to protect himself is both honest and reasonable.67  If 
a defendant is able to claim perfect self-defense, his actions are considered fully justified.
68
  
Perfect self-defense results in full exoneration.
69
  Imperfect self-defense occurs where the actor’s 
belief in the necessity of using force is honest but unreasonable.
70
  Imperfect self-defense does 
not result in acquittal because the actor was unreasonable in his decision to use force.  In most 
jurisdictions, a finding of imperfect self-defense will reduce murder to manslaughter.  However, 
a few jurisdictions do not recognize imperfect self-defense.  In these jurisdictions, an actor who 
has an unreasonable belief of the necessity to use force will be guilty of murder.    
                                                        
65
 KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 1, at 515.  
66
 Id.  
67
 People v. LaVoie, 395 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1964).  
68
 Heller, supra note 29, at 10-12.  
69
 Id. at 12.  
70
 State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 816 (1983). 
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Additionally, in order for self-defense to be reasonable, the actor must abide by two 
additional rules; the rule of necessity and the rule of proportionality.
71
  Under the requirement of 
necessity, the force used in self-defense must only be used to the extent necessary.
72
 The concept 
of necessity is intertwined with the concept of imminence.
73
  Imminence requires that the actor 
be presently under attack in order to justify self-defense.  The imminence requirement is 
inseparable from the rule of necessity because “without imminence there is no assurance that the 
defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm.”74  The justification for this inseparability is that 
if harm is not imminent then the actor can and should take steps to avoid the necessity of 
responding with deadly force.  Accordingly, if a threat is not imminent, it is not reasonable to 
employ fatal force and the claim of self-defense consequently fails.   
Under the proportionality rule, a person cannot use force that is excessive to the harm 
threatened.
75
  Thus, the use of deadly force can only be used in self-defense when the unlawful 
force is deadly or capable of grievous bodily harm.   
While Battered Woman’s Syndrome (“BWS”) is not a legal defense, it may be used to 
prove other defenses.  In the late 1970s psychologist Lenore Walker coined the term battered 
woman’s syndrome to describe the characteristic psychological impact of prolonged domestic 
abuse on adult women.
76
  Domestic abuse can be categorized into three main categories: physical 
                                                        
71
 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill their Batterers, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 371, 380-82 (1993).  
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. at 380.  
75
 Id.  
76
 Nancy Wright, Voice for the Voiceless: The Case for Adopting the “Domestic Abuse 
Syndrome” for Self-Defense Purposes for All Victims of Domestic Violence Who Kill Their 
Abusers, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 76, 78 (2009).  
15 
 
injury, sexual abuse and psychological maltreatment.
77
  This abuse follows a cyclical pattern 
consisting of three phases.
78
 The first phase is the ‘tension-building’ period, where the batterer 
begins to express hostility toward the victim.
79
  The second is the ‘acute explosion’ period, when 
the abuse takes place.
80
 The third stage is the ‘loving contrition’ period, where the batterer 
apologizes, seeks forgiveness, and promises to change.
81
 Each of the three phases of abuse is 
characterized by specific behavior patterns on the part of the batter.
82
  
Evidence of BWS may be used to support a variety of defenses, including self-defense 
and provocation.  Expert testimony on BWS is used to describe the devastating psychological 
impact of a lifetime of severe physical, sexual, and psychological violence. This testimony on 
BWS is critical for the jury to hear, because it demonstrates the reasonableness of a battered 
woman’s use of lethal force to defend herself when claiming either self-defense or provocation.  
Thus, expert testimony on BWS is essential for battered women who kill their abusers. Although, 
courts have generally allowed expert testimony on BWS, admission is not guaranteed.  
Furthermore, states have differed to the extent they will allow evidence of BWS to be considered 
by the jury.  
V. SELF-DEFENSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  
The right to defend oneself when presented with a threat of imminent death or great 
bodily harm is deeply imbedded in our notions of justice and is incorporated in the criminal law 
of self-defense.  On its face, the doctrine of self-defense seems facially neutral, however, the 
doctrine has been largely shaped by male perceptions of what constitutes appropriate self-
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defense.
83
  Consequently, female defendants face substantial obstacles in pleading self-defense.
84
   
The judicial application of reasonableness, and the traditional rules of self-defense, such as, the 
imminence requirement and the requirement of equal proportionality pose specific problems for 
battered women defendants.  
This section utilizes the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Norman to 
illustrate the defects in the law of self-defense as it applies battered women defendants.  The goal 
of this section is to exemplify the need for changes in the law that will recognize women’s 
reactions to violence and ensure a more equitable treatment of cases involving battered women.  
The facts of the Norman case present the most dramatic and challenging situation for self-
defense: an abused woman who kills a sleeping man.   
A. The Case of Judy Norman 
At fourteen, Judy Norman, the defendant, married John Thomas Norman.
85
  For over 
twenty years, Judy suffered extreme physical and emotional abuse at the hands of her husband.
86
  
In addition to putting cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee on her, and breaking glass 
against her face, Judy’s husband commonly punched her, kicked her, and threw objects at her.87  
He forced her to make money by prostitution, and would beat her if she resisting prostituting 
herself or if he was dissatisfied with the amount of money she earned.
88
  Subjecting her to futher 
degradation, he frequently treated her like a dog: making her eat out of a dog bowl, bark like a 
dog, and sleep on the floor of their bedroom like a dog.
89
  He also regularly deprived her and 
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their children from eating or going to get food.
90
 Although she tried to leave him several times, “ 
. . . he had always found her, brought her home, and beaten her.”91  
Two days before his death, John, again forced Judy to prostitute herself at a local rest 
area.
92
  While driving home after beating her at the rest stop, he was arrested for drunk driving. 
93
 
After his release the next morning, “he resumed his drinking and abuse of the defendant.”94  
Later that day, police were called to the house in response to the domestic abuse.  Although, Judy 
stated, “her husband had been beating her all day” she refused to file a complaint because she 
feared that he “would kill her if she had him arrested.”95  Less than an hour later, the police were 
called back to house.  Judy had attempted suicide by ingesting a bottle of pills.  While 
paramedics attended her, Mr. Norman tried to interfere, saying, “Let the bitch die . . . She ain’t 
nothing but a dog . . . She don’t deserve to live,” and threatened to kill her, her mother, and her 
grandmother, however, Judy survived.
96
 
The next morning, with the help of a hospital therapist, she went to a mental health center 
to discuss filing charges against her husband and his possible civil commitment.
97
  Returning 
from the center, Judy confronted her husband about having him committed if he refused to stop 
drinking.
98
  In response, he “told her he would ‘see them coming’ and would cut her throat 
before they got to him.”99  That day Judy also tried to go to the social service office to apply for 
welfare benefits, “but her husband followed her there, interrupted her interview, and made her go 
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home with him.”100  When they got home, he continued to abuse Judy by putting a cigarette out 
on her, slapping and kicking her, and threatening to kill and maim her.  
 Later that evening, Judy was babysitting her daughter’s baby.101  When the baby started 
to cry, Judy took the baby to her mother’s house fearing that it would wake up and anger her 
husband.
102
 After taking a pistol from her mother’s purse, Judy walked the short distance home 
and shot her sleeping husband in the back of the head.
103
  
The trial court found Judy guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced her to six 
years in prison.
104
  The Court of Appeals granted a new trial, finding error with the trial court’s 
refusal to submit a possible verdict of acquittal by reason of self-defense.
105
  In reversing, the 
Appeals Court, the North Carolina Supreme Court held as a matter of law, a sleeping victim does 
not present the imminent threat required before a defendant is entitled to an instruction on either 
perfect or imperfect self-defense.
106
 
B. The Problem with Imminence  
Defensive force must be necessary in order to avoid serious bodily harm.  As previously 
explained, the element of necessity incorporates the requirement of imminence.  Self-defense 
requires imminence, “because, and only because, of the fear that without imminence there is no 
assurance that the defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm.”107 Thus a finding of 
imminence is a condition precedent for a finding of necessity.
108
  The problem of battered 
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women has provoked an inquiry into the traditional requirements of self-defense to determine 
whether we should maintain a strict requirement of imminence in assessing which attacks trigger 
a legitimate defensive response.”109   
The case of Judy Norman illustrates how the imminence requirement of self-defense is ill 
equipped to deal with the problem of battered women.  Judy was fourteen years old when she 
married her husband.  For over twenty years Judy was severely beaten, forced into prostitution, 
and threatened with mutilation and death.   She had five children, no money of her own, and 
nowhere to escape.  In the two days preceding the killing, the severity of the beatings and death 
threats to herself and her family had increased.  In response, she had also increased her attempts 
to escape, even the ultimate escape, suicide, but was unsuccessful.  For over twenty years the 
abuse had only become more severe.  Her continued abuse was inevitable and her death was 
clearly foreseeable.  If the harm is inevitable and unavoidable, why must she wait until the harm 
is imminent?   
According the North Carolina Supreme Court, Judy had to wait until the harm was 
immediate before employing deadly force.
110
   Explaining, the court noted that Judy did not face 
“an instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being killed or seriously injured and 
that she “had ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse by 
her husband.”111 Consistent with this decision, the court found the record devoid of evidence that 
Judy had reasonable grounds to believe in an imminent attack.
112
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In taking the position that “immediate and “imminent” are synonymous, the court 
followed the traditional strict interpretation of the requirement.  It is this narrow interpretation of 
imminence that provides the basis for the court’s conclusion that Mrs. Norman lacked any belief, 
reasonable or otherwise, that an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm confronted her.   
The North Carolina Supreme Court defended its strict adherence to the imminence 
requirement because it was necessary to ensure that “deadly force will be used only where it is 
necessary as a last resort in the exercise of the inherent right of self-preservation.”113  According 
to the court, the imminence requirement guarantees that “the defendant reasonably belied that 
absence the use of deadly force . . . the attack would have caused death or great bodily harm.”114  
However, this is a case of semantics clouding substance; the evidence, considered in the 
aggregate, clearly supports an inference that her actions were necessary in order to prevent an 
attack that would cause great bodily harm and that Mrs. Norman believed in an imminent threat.  
Similarly, Justice Martin, in writing for the dissent, found that the unique and complex situation 
of battered women warrants a less strict interpretation of the imminence requirement.  Justice 
Martin found that an abused spouse’s fear that “‘one day her husband [would] kill her in the 
course of a beating’”115 created an honest belief that the “danger [was] constantly ‘immediate.’” 
The imminence requirement unfairly precludes battered women who kill in non-
confrontational settings from claiming self-defense. The imminence requirement fails to 
recognize the common situation of the abused woman, who finds all exits blocked and who 
reasonably anticipates a severe assault which she does not have the strength to repel, and 
therefore kills her abuser at a time when the abuser is asleep or otherwise incapacitated.  While 
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the harm in this situation may not be imminent, in strict interpretation of the word, the future 
harm is inevitable.  This inevitability component, unique to the domestic violence context, 
warrants further consideration in applying the requirement of imminence in self-defense.   
C. Battered Women as Reasonable Self-Defenders  
The crux of self-defense is the concept of reasonableness. As Gillespie explains: 
The ultimate question in a self-defense case is whether the 
defendant’s act was a reasonable one.  Even if she can successfully 
negotiate the legal hurdles of seriousness, imminence, retreat, and 
the like, she must still convince the jury of two things: that her 
belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury 
was reasonable under the circumstances and that her response to 
that perceived danger was a reasonable one, not an overreaction.
116
   
 
What is considered reasonable is based upon a male standard of conduct.  Thus the 
reasonable requirement in the law of self-defense asks what a reasonable man would have done 
in a battered woman’s situation.  This question is at odds with the reality faced by battered 
woman.   What is considered to be a reasonable response to deadly force is based upon a one-
time confrontation between two males who are relatively unknown to each other.   The basic 
paradigm goes something like this, “There is a fight.  In the heat of the fight man A comes at 
man B with a weapon, man B picks up a similar weapon, uses similar force, and kills man A.”117  
From this scenario flow the requirements of equal force, provocation, and imminence.  
This male model of conduct presents particular problems for female victims of domestic 
violence who claim they acted in self-defense.  First, the above standard presumes an encounter 
between two men of roughly equal size and ability.
118
  Women are disadvantaged under this 
model because men are typically stronger, taller, and heavier.  This inequality in size and 
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strength between men and women is problematic in light of the equal force requirement, which 
precludes a person who is attacked without a deadly weapon from responding with a deadly 
weapon.    Preventing someone from employing a knife or a firearm when attacked only with 
brute force is reasonable when it is applied to the prototype of two males of equal size and 
strength, however, the requirement becomes more unreasonable as we move further from this 
limited scenario.  For example, requiring a five-foot-five inch woman to somehow repel an 
assault by a six-foot-two inch intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense seems 
neither reasonable nor fair.   
Second, the above standard also presumes a single encounter between two parties who 
are relatively unknown to each other.  This presumption excludes the domestic violence context 
where the attacker and the victim are in a relationship.  In this context, the attacker has usually 
established himself as the dominant one in the relationship. Furthermore, battered women who 
defend themselves are not responding to a single attack but rather an ongoing threat of violence.   
Because the traditional definition of self-defense has been centered on male behavior it is 
hard for jurors to identify actions taken in self-defense outside this context.  Female defendants 
who kill their male batterers and claim they acted in self-defense are at a disadvantage because 
their reasonable response to physical violence is likely to differ then a man’s due to her 
difference in size, strength, and prior victimization.”119  Therefore, in order for female 
defendants to have a fair chance of claiming self-defense, the way we interpret the law must 
reflect situations beyond the prototypical male-based model.  
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i. Preconceived notions of battered women 
Battered women defendants must also overcome preconceptions of battered women in 
general, such as the erroneous belief that battered women are masochists who enjoy being 
battered, and the belief that these women could have easily left the relationship at any time.
120
  In 
a brief study evaluating public opinion on battered women, Ewing and Aubrey surveyed 216 
randomly selected people.
121
  Each subject was given the identical scenario of abuse, and then 
asked if they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about the incident.
122
  The “results 
showed that 63.7% of the participants thought that the wife could simply leave the relationship if 
she was afraid, and 41% thought if the wife did not leave and the abuse continued then the wife 
was masochistic.
123
   
The common belief that “she could have just left” or that she enjoys being abused is 
problematic when applying the necessity and reasonableness requirement.  For example, if 
members of a jury believe that a battered woman can simply just leave the relationship to avoid 
being abused, it is hard for them to find that her actions were necessary, because she could have 
simply ended the relationship and thus avoided the necessity of responding with force.  Likewise, 
her claim that she acted reasonably is also diminished because if she could have just left, but 
chose to stay despite the abuse, her actions are not going to be perceived as reasonable.  
However, these beliefs reflect a misunderstanding of the effects of domestic violence and ignore 
the complex reality that these women face.   
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 First, women who stay in abusive relationships are not inherently irrational people.  
Women of domestic violence do not leave for several reasons, including unwillingness to 
abandon or hurt others, lack of financial independence, lack of alternatives, fear of change or 
uncertainty, and the belief that things will get better.
124
  These beliefs are not unique to battered 
women.
125
  Instead, these are common reasons for anyone who has stayed in a situation longer 
than they should have, whether that situation is a job, school, living arrangement, or relationship.   
However, in the domestic violence context, these reasons are aggravated by the violent and 
controlling nature of the abuser.  Abusers tend to isolate their victims from outside help by 
attempting “to exercise total power over “their” women, by cutting them off from friends and 
family, by making sure that they have no independent source of money, and by threatening them 
with more severe physical abuse and even death if they attempt to leave.”126  
Related to the presumption that battered women can leave the relationship at any point, 
abused defendants must also overcome the generally unpleasant idea that killing their batterer 
was the only reasonable option to stop the abuse.  Those who criticize a woman’s decision to 
resort to deadly force generally argue that she could have done something else: she could have 
left, she could have gone to a shelter, she could have gone to the police, she could have gotten a 
restraining order.  Yes, theoretically, in every case she could have done something else.  
However, whether any other choice was actually reasonable or even feasible in her situation is a 
separate question.   
Not only do women of domestic violence generally lack the financial independence to 
leave their relationship; they also have nowhere to go if they did.  Although women’s shelters 
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provide a potentially safe place to escape an abusive relationship, her area may lack shelters.  In 
fact there are more animal shelters than there are women’s shelters in the United States.127  
Further, even if she had access to a shelter, it may only be a temporary or short-term facility.    
In addition, there is inadequate police protection and judicial support for victims of 
domestic violence.  Many women who have been abused by their partners have tried, and failed, 
to get help from the police.  As scholars Caroline Forell and Donna Matthews note, “[T]he law is 
often ineffectual.  For example, in a [1994] U.S. Department of Justice study, Marianne Zawitz 
estimated that nearly 90 percent of women killed by intimates had previously called the police, 
and half of these [women] had called five or more times.”128  Furthermore, even if the police 
were effective at helping battered women, they cannot provide continuous protection from her 
abuser everywhere and all the time.  Restraining orders have also proved ineffective in keeping 
an abuser away.  Most importantly, women are at the greatest risk of death when they separate 
from their abusive partner.
129
  Indeed, “most scholarly and empirical research indicates that a 
woman leaving her abuser is directly related to an escalation of violence by the abuser that can 
be lethal.”130 
 In commenting on the lack of alternatives for women who have ultimately killed their 
partners, Gillespie notes:  
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If she is like the overwhelming majority of battered women, she 
also knows, first hand, that she cannot rely on the police, the 
courts, neighbors, relatives, or anyone else for protection against 
her violent mate.  Every attempt to get help is likely only to 
reinforce her perception that she has no alternative but to protect 
herself.
131
  
 
Although the idea is unsettling, the reality of the situation is that some battered women lack any 
meaningful alternative.  In order for female defendants who kill their abuser to have a fair 
chance in establishing a claim of self defense, it is necessary to recognize the complex situation 
and choices battered women face.   
ii. Gender and Emotion   
The law of self-defense fails to reflect the different ways that women and men tend to 
experience emotion and respond to stressful incidents.  Instead the law reflects typically male 
reactions to emotion.  This failure to reflect the emotional experiences and reactions of women 
negatively impacts women defendants who do not react the way the law presumes they should, 
like a man.   
Numerous studies have demonstrated that women and men approach emotion differently 
and respond differently to hormones in times of stress.
132
   Different theories have been advanced 
in an attempt to explain this difference such as, “sex differences in experience, genetics, 
neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and gender socialization.”133  Irrespective of the nature of the 
difference, studies have generally found that men are quicker to use “physical force to achieve 
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their desired ends,” whereas, women are more likely to use verbal persuasion to achieve their 
goals.
134
  
The law presumes and it seems reasonable that if your partner hits you, you should walk 
away.
135
  However, this assumption does not reflect the emotional complexity of domestic 
violence relationships and the way in which women may respond to stress and violence.
136
  
Scholar Katherine Baker argues that if we recognize the different ways that women and men tend 
to experience emotion, we need not explain a battered women’s inability to leave the relationship 
as irrational or unreasonable.
137
  Noting that the law only recognizes either hitting back or 
running away, the so-called “fight or flight” response, as the appropriate reaction to a stressful 
incident, she argues that the law exhibits male bias.
138
  Acknowledging the research and 
experiments observing the “fight or flight” response, Baker points out that these studies had used 
only males as subjects.
139
  After experiments began focusing on female reactions, studies 
revealed a new response, which they labeled “tend and befriend.”140  As opposed to fighting or 
fleeing to a stressful stimulus, “one who tends and befriends in times of stress reacts by reaching 
out to support groups and taking particularly good care of dependents.”141   
 Research indicates that women are more likely to tend and befriend due to the way in 
which oxytocin affects women as opposed to men.
142
  The hormone, oxytocin, “is released at 
times of intense emotional attachment, such as when falling in love, when in labor or nursing, 
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and when experiencing certain stressful events.”143  Release of this hormone makes people feel 
like they “have bonded with one another.”144   However, the effect that a release of this hormone 
has on the body may differ between men and women due to the way oxytocin reacts with 
estrogen and testosterone: estrogen enhances the effects of oxytocin while testosterone bocks 
oxytocin’s effects.145  Baker and other scholars theorize that women are more likely to feel 
attachment then men because women have higher estrogen levels and lower testosterone levels 
than men.
146
  Although the data on the effect of oxytocin in still developing, this biological 
difference between the sexes may help to explain why female victims of domestic violence do 
not respond to physical abuse the way the law presumes that they should, by just walking 
away.
147
   
D. The Catch 22 in Battered Woman’s Syndrome  
Doctor Lenore Walker introduced the concept of Battered Woman Syndrome (“BWS”) in 
the 1970s to help remedy how the criminal law of self-defense was not adequately taking into 
account experiences of battered women.
148
  BWS is most commonly used where a female 
defendant is claiming self-defense for killing her batterer.
149
  The main goal in introducing expert 
testimony on BWS is to demonstrate that the defendant’s actions in self-defense were 
“reasonable.” As explain by Professor Schneider:  
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Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was developed to 
explain the common experiences of, and the impact of repeated 
abuse on, battered women.  The goal was to assist the jury and the 
court in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of the battered 
women’s action and to redress this historical imbalance, at least 
where the testimony was proffered as relevant to self-defense.
150
  
 
Furthermore, expert testimony on BWS can assist the jury in putting the victim’s personal 
battering experience in context by assisting “the factfinder in making sense of the information 
obtained about a particular battered woman and her situation by placing that information within 
the parameters of what is known about battered women generally.
151
   
Testimony on BWS typically includes Lenore Walker’s “cycle of violence” theory, which 
is premised on the notion that abusive relationships follow a cyclical pattern consisting of three 
phases.
152
   It is this pattern that creates in the victim a “learned helplessness,” in other words, a 
sense that she cannot escape from the abusive relationship.
153
  In explaining this recurring pattern 
of abuse, the expert is able to explain why a battered woman has special knowledge of the 
imminence of an attack, as well as why retreat was not a reasonable alternative.
154
  Expert 
testimony is essential in providing the jury with information about “otherwise puzzling aspects 
of the defendant’s behavior    especially her failure to leave or get help or tell anyone,”155 and 
about how “the battered women’s prediction of the likely extent and imminence of violence is 
particularly acute and accurate.”156 
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 However, the admission of BWS to explain the reasonableness of a victim-defendant’s 
actions against her abuser has been a hotly contested area of criminal law.
157
  Despite the 
benefits and perhaps the necessity of introducing expert testimony on BWS to explain the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, its introduction can have a paradoxical effect.   
Significant criticism has been focused on the use of the word “syndrome” and how this 
label tends to “conjure up images of a psychological defense   a separate defense and/or an 
impaired mental state defense.”158  In critiquing the characterization of BWS as a mental health 
disorder, Professor Coughlin argues that “The [battered woman syndrome] defense itself defines 
the woman as a collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and behavioral 
abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental premise of the defense is that women lack the 
psychological capacity to choose lawful means to extricate themselves from abusive mates.
159
 
Scholars further argue that BWS reinforces negative stereotypes of women by playing “into the 
traditional belief that abused women who kill their abusers are mentally unbalanced rather than 
acting reasonably in response to a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm.”160  
Furthermore, scholars argue that because testimony regarding BWS is inherently filled with 
implications that the victim-defendant is somehow psychologically impaired or incapacitated, its 
use contradicts the very purpose of introducing the testimony in the first place: to “shed light on 
the reasonableness of the defendants behavior.
161”  Thus using testimony about a “syndrome” to 
explain what a reasonable person would do is a contradiction in terms.   
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 In addition, testimony on BWS may also not be effective due to its focus on a 
psychological diagnosis of “learned helplessness.”  Walker’s concept of “learned helplessness,” 
which is premised on the theory that an abused woman becomes more passive and controllable 
by her abuser as time goes on,
162
 is internally contradictory in the case of an abused woman who 
kills her abuser.  On the one hand the jury is presented with information that suggests that her 
partner’s persistent abuse and psychological domination created in the defendant a learned 
helplessness, whereby the defendant believed she was unable to leave the relationship.   And on 
the other hand, the jury is presented with the fact that she killed her batterer.  This theory of 
learned helpless in the context of a woman who kills her abuser leaves the members of the jury 
wondering: How helpless could she have been if she managed to kill her abuser?   
 In spite of its shortcomings, testimony on BWS is still necessary for battered woman 
defendants because it remains the only alternative for women to present evidence of the general 
effects of battery at their trial.
163
   However, it is necessary to recognize the doctrine’s 
shortcomings and change the focus of how expert testimony on BWS is used.   Instead of 
focusing on the helplessness or incapacity of the defendant, testimony should be centered on the 
societal pressures and conditions that place women in inescapable violent relationships. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The doctrines of provocation and self-defense focus on typically masculine emotions, 
realities, and reactions.  The provocation doctrine favors quick actions made in anger or as a 
result of a loss of control.  The most common provocation claims involve cases of infidelity or 
perceived infidelity.  Self-defense, on the other hand, requires no more than equal force to defend 
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a reasonable belief of an imminent attack.  These doctrines have proved to be ineffective when 
dealing with battered women defendants.  Fear, not anger, is the primarily emotion when women 
kill an intimate partner.  This emotion increases as abused women realize that it is impossible to 
escape.  Furthermore, provocation and self-defense extend over time for battered women who are 
subjected to repeated abuse.   In order for female defendants who kill their batterers to have an 
equal chance of claiming self-defense, it is necessary that the law reflect their complex situation.  
Overall, it is essential to accept that sometimes the only reasonable alternative available 
to battered women, to escape their life of abuse, is to kill their batter.  This paper does not 
suggest that every female defendant who was previously abused should be acquitted, or that all 
battered women are entitled self-defense, or that there should be a special “battered woman 
defense.”  Instead, society and the law need to recognize the drastic problem of domestic 
violence including the social norms that make violence against women permissible and 
understandable.  Similarly, local government actors, such as the police and social services 
agencies, need to be better equipped to deal with the problem of domestic violence, so that these 
agencies become reasonable alternatives for battered women utilize. Furthermore, expert 
testimony needs to emphasize the societal pressures that place women in inescapable violent 
relationships, rather than emphasizing the helplessness or particular psychological profile of the 
individual defendant.    
 In regards to the law of provocation, the doctrine needs to be sharply curtailed so that 
adequate provocation does not include partner infidelity, separation from a relationship, or a 
general loss of self-control.  Restricting provocation in this way would help combat the belief 
that male violent rage is a normal aspect of masculinity, while still allowing the defense of 
women who resort to deadly force to defend themselves against their abusers. 
